THE public inquiry into the accident revealed a catalogue of errors contributed to the tragedy.

Faulty signalling was believed to be the main cause of the crash – old live wiring had not been removed from a Clapham signalling box as part of the Waterloo area re-signalling scheme.

An old live cable, although not connected, made a circuit to a relay that cause an incorrect signal to be given to driver John Rolls.

But both the inquiry, led by Sir Anthony Hidden QC, and British Rail’s own internal investigation also unveiled poor fire safety standards, a lack of proper auditing and a telephone system for contacting the main electrical switchboard that didn’t work.

In addition there were bad practices by the engineers involved in the re-signalling, no proper supervision and no independent testing and at least two drivers noticed the faulty signal but failed to report it.

The inquiry called for a radical overhaul of the historic character of the running of the railways and made 93 recommendations to BR, the government and the emergency services.

Sir Anthony wanted to change BR’s safety culture to ensure an accident could never happen again as a result of dangerous work practices causing faulty signal wiring.

BR chairman Sir Robert Reid pledged to improve safety, introducing measures including a new driver-signal acknowledgement system and cab radios, as well as spending £1m on enhancing the safety of carriages.